Wednesday, May 31, 2017

The Folly of Merging State Department and USAID: Lessons from USIA


Shannon N. Green, Daniel F. Runde csis.org; via NC

Image  (not from article) from Folly Beach: Pictures, with caption: Toddler making his way to the water on Folly Beach near Charleston SC.

***

The 2018 budget introduced by the Trump administration calls for a greater focus on U.S. security and economic growth; in practice, it will undermine those very goals by slashing programs that are vital to America’s interests. As part of its plan to cut $3.6 trillion in federal spending over the next decade, the administration proposed a 30 percent decrease in diplomacy and development expenditures, eliminating essential programs and gutting humanitarian relief and multilateral support. The potential spending cuts elicited vocal pushback from diplomatic, development, and national security experts, who are rightly concerned that such sweeping reductions in funding would irreparably erode U.S. influence around the world.

Yet, while policymakers and pundits debate the merits of the budget proposal—which several Republican leaders have proclaimed is “dead on arrival”—bigger and potentially more lasting changes are being contemplated by the administration. In response to President Trump’s request for reorganization proposals, the Department of State’s leadership is quietly reviewing various options to streamline the United States’ diplomatic and development operations. One of the proposals under consideration is a merger of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Proponents of such a merger argue that it would save taxpayer dollars, reduce duplication of effort, and improve coordination on diplomatic and development objectives. While there are certainly changes that can be made at both organizations, a State Department/USAID merger—where personnel, procurement, programmatic, and budgeting functions are combined—would be a huge mistake.
To understand the risks and downsides of such a move, we can look to the experience of the merger of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA [JB - see]) into the State Department in 1999.
USIA was created in 1953 to provide a home for public diplomacy activities in support of U.S. foreign policy; in short, USIA took the lead in the war of ideas between the United States and the Soviet Union following World War II. The agency’s mission statement was to “understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion of the national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and U.S. institutions, and their counterparts abroad.” It was, by all accounts, highly effective in its pursuit of that mission. The Cold War was won because the United States had a better economic system and because the United States had better ideas and values. USIA helped present those ideas and values, and USIA’s public diplomacy campaigns around the world played a major role in that victory.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a broad perception that the U.S. foreign policy machine was no longer fit to purpose. It was the “end of history”— liberal democracy had emerged victorious over communism, and the United States was eager to reap the benefits of this peace dividend. Against this backdrop, policymakers and appropriators pushed to decommission agencies that were deemed superfluous or unwieldy. Without a major global ideological foe, many felt that USIA no longer needed to be a stand-alone agency, and by the late 1990s, momentum for change was growing.
The idea of restructuring USIA was first put forward in Vice President Al Gore’s Reinventing Government blueprint. The plan was to fold USAID, USIA, and the independent Arms Controls and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the State Department. ACDA was happy to merge with the State Department given that its functions were diplomatic in nature. In contrast, USIA and USAID had different functions and skills from diplomacy and resisted the consolidation. With strong support from Senator Jesse Helms, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the backing of President Bill Clinton, a deal was cut. USIA became a sacrificial lamb, and its cultural, educational, and informational functions shifted to the State Department under the newly created under secretary for public affairs and public diplomacy, along with ACDA. USAID survived as an independent agency but was formally linked to the State Department with the USAID administrator reporting to the secretary of state.
In its “Reorganization Plan and Report,” the Clinton administration said that the goal of the merger was “to strengthen public diplomacy through its integration into the policy process.” When implemented, the restructuring did the opposite. Dismantling USIA and shifting its primary functions to the State Department crippled U.S. public diplomacy operations in ways that have been lasting and profound—a self-inflicted wound from which the United States is still recovering. Even the Heritage Foundation, which is currently advocating for a consolidation of the State Department and USAID, called the USIA merger “misguided” and noted that it had caused the effective collapse of U.S. public diplomacy.
A primary reason for the failed integration of USIA stems from the vastly different missions and cultures of the two organizations. The State Department has traditionally focused on state-to-state relations and has a deep aversion to risk. These entrenched norms were not compatible with the culture of people-to-people engagement and experimentation that had made USIA such a success. A former under secretary described it as “grafting a foreign body onto a human body, and the human body rejected it.” USIA had recruited and retained thousands of employees with skills like sophisticated audience analysis and storytelling that were distinct from those appreciated within the State Department. These skills were ignored, marginalized, and atrophied after the merger. Only in recent years has the State Department started to remedy the situation, creating more pathways for public diplomacy officers to get promoted into senior roles.
State Department and USIA budget functions were also merged, meaning the State Department had to choose between “a new couch for the ambassador” or an additional dollar for public diplomacy. Public diplomacy was (and is) seen as a secondary or tertiary function of the State Department. Budgets, promotions, and priorities reflect its inferior status, and public diplomacy activities have been consistently subordinated to diplomatic goals. Public diplomacy dollars have also been scattered across regional bureaus where non–public diplomacy experts make resource allocation decisions. As a result, there is a scattershot effect on the use of these scarce resources.
The consolidation was also short-sighted. Less than two years later, the United States suffered the horror of the 9/11 attacks, launching the Global War on Terror. The country had unknowingly embarked on a new war of ideas with a determined global enemy but without a preeminent, well-resourced, expertly staffed, and functional public diplomacy apparatus. At the same time, global competitors, including China and Russia, made significant investments in their own public diplomacy operations—spreading their influence throughout Africa, Eurasia, and Southeast Asia at the very time that the United States was seen as retreating.
As a consequence, the United States has spent the last 15 years trying to rebuild its public diplomacy infrastructure. This process has taken significant time, money, and effort—and U.S. public diplomacy capabilities are still not back to where they started. While there have been improvements in recent years, the United States essentially gave its global competitors from Russia to ISIS a decade’s head start in the war of ideas. We cannot afford this kind of misstep when it comes to global development.
A merger of USAID into the State Department would do several things. Development dollars will ultimately compete with diplomacy dollars; development will lose out just as public diplomacy has. The competition for senior foreign service slots will be among development and diplomacy, and similarly, development professionals will suffer.

Like USIA, USAID has unique capacities and expertise that would be lost if it were folded into the State Department. A merger would remove a development voice from the policy table and degrade international development expertise. Career professionals flock to USAID as a global leader on development, poverty reduction, and democratic governance. These are jobs that require specific training and expertise and cannot be successfully filled by generalist foreign service or civil service officers.
Moreover, USAID’s organizational culture embraces innovation, partnerships, and learning—attributes that have helped it pioneer lifesaving technologies like oral rehydration therapies, resulting in 4 million fewer children dying of diarrheal diseases each year than three decades ago. These approaches are valued within the development field but would wither on the vine of the State Department’s diplomatic mission and more traditional culture. This loss would harm our ability to impact and influence a set of critical issues—the global refugee crisis, the threat of pandemics, violent extremism, among others—that USAID is uniquely suited to address.
The USAID brand, while linked to the U.S. government, allows partners who would not otherwise work with the United States to partner with us. USAID has generated billions in parallel investments from other donors—bilateral and multilateral—by virtue of its recognized leadership and independence. That ability to convince others to follow our lead would be lost in Africa and other regions, where China is waiting to step in—with a far different set of values and interests. Moreover, if the United States were to lose its bilateral development expertise, there would be a temptation to “outsource” development work to UN agencies and multilateral development banks. These multilateral agencies have an important role to play, but they do not directly represent U.S. interests.
Finally, in contrast to public diplomacy, which represents a set of tools to inform and engage international audiences about U.S. foreign policy and values, USAID’s value is not merely as an instrument of diplomacy. Development is a distinct and longer-term objective in and of itself. Of course development can and does help advance policy objectives—from improving security in Central America to countering violent extremism throughout Africa, from building trade capacity in Southeast Asia to strengthening democracy and the rule of law in the Middle East.
But, development, as a process for transforming socioeconomic and political conditions and lifting people out of poverty, cannot be achieved if it is exclusively tied to short-term and rapidly evolving policy imperatives. Development outcomes need time and consistency to come to fruition. The U.S. government’s efforts to combat malaria and HIV/AIDS—in which nearly 20 million lives have been saved—have required substantial and sustained investment over 15 years. Likewise, improving security and creating the conditions for a peace agreement in Colombia have taken almost 20 years. Such achievements would not have been possible had USAID been operating on the State Department’s one- or two-year timelines.
The world is as fast moving and dangerous as it has ever been. Now more than ever, we need our full tool kit to engage and shape the environment beyond our borders. Short-term savings and “efficiency gains” should not obscure the long-term value of a specialized, stand-alone development agency. U.S. security, prosperity, and values would be severely harmed if we eliminated or dismantled all or significant parts of USAID.
Shannon N. Green is a senior fellow and director of the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Daniel F. Runde holds the Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis and is director of the CSIS Project on Prosperity and Development.

U.S. Options to Develop a Cyberspace Influence Capability


divergentoptions.org


image from

Sina Kashefipour is the founder and producer of the national security podcast The Loopcast.  He  currently works as an analyst.  The opinions expressed in this paper do not represent the position of his employer.  Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

National Security Situation:  The battle for control and influence over the information space.
Date Originally Written:  May 18, 2017.
Date Originally Published:  May 29, 2017.
Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author believes that there is no meat space or cyberspace, there is only the information space.  The author also believes that while the tools, data, and knowledge are available, there is no United States organization designed primarily to address the issue of information warfare.
Background:  Information warfare is being used by state and non-state adversaries. Information warfare, broadly defined, makes use of information technology to gain an advantage over an adversary.  Information is the weapon, the target, and the medium through which this type of conflict takes place[1][2][3].  Information warfare includes tactics such as misinformation, disinformation, propaganda, psychological operations and computer network operations [3][4][5].
Significance:  Information warfare is a force multiplier.  Control and mastery of information determines success in politics and enables the driving of the political narrative with the benefit of not having to engage in overt warfare.  Information warfare has taken a new edge as the information space and the political are highly interlinked and can, in some instances, be considered as one[6][7][8].
Option #1:  The revival of the United States Information Agency (USIA) or the creation of a government agency with similar function and outlook. The USIA’s original purpose can be summed as:
  • “To explain and advocate U.S. policies in terms that are credible and meaningful in foreign cultures”
  • “To provide information about the official policies of the United States, and about the people, values, and institutions which influence those policies”
  • “To bring the benefits of international engagement to American citizens and institutions by helping them build strong long-term relationships with their counterparts overseas”
  • “To advise the President and U.S. government policy-makers on the ways in which foreign attitudes will have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of U.S. policies.[9]”
USIA’s original purpose was largely designated by the Cold War.  The aforementioned four points are a good starting point, but any revival of the USIA would involve the resulting organization as one devoted to modern information warfare.  A modern USIA would not just focus on what a government agency can do but also build ties with other governments and across the private sector including with companies like Google, Facebook, and Twitter as they are platforms that have been used recently to propagate information warfare campaigns [10][11].  Private sector companies are also essential to understanding and limiting these types of campaigns [10][12][13][14].  Furthermore, building ties and partnering with other countries facing similar issues to engage in information warfare would be part of the mission [15][16][17].
Risk:  There are two fundamental risks to reconstituting a USIA: where does a USIA agency fit within the national security bureaucracy and how does modern information warfare pair with the legal bounds of the first amendment?
Defining the USIA within the national security apparatus would be difficult[18].  The purpose of the USIA would be easy to state, but difficult to bureaucratically define.  Is this an organization to include public diplomacy and how does that pair/compete with the Department of State’s public diplomacy mission?  Furthermore, if this is an organization to include information warfare how does that impact Department of Defense capabilities such as the National Security Agency or United States Cyber Command?  Where does the Broadcasting Board of Governors fit in?  Lastly, modern execution of successful information warfare relies on a whole of government approach or the ability to advance strategy in an interdisciplinary fashion, which is difficult given the complexity of the bureaucracy.
The second risk is how does an agency engage in information warfare in regards to the first amendment?  Consider for a moment that if war or conflict that sees information as the weapon, the target, and the medium, what role can the government legally play?  Can a government wage information warfare without, say, engaging in outright censorship or control of information mediums like Facebook and Twitter?  The legal framework surrounding these issues are ill-defined at present [19][20].
Gain:  Having a fully funded cabinet level organization devoted to information warfare complete with the ability to network across government agencies, other governments and the private sector able to both wage and defend the United States against information warfare.
Option #2:  Smaller and specific interagency working groups similar to the Active Measures Working Group of the late eighties.  The original Active Measures Working Group was an interagency collaboration devoted to countering Soviet disinformation, which consequently became the “U.S Government’s body of expertise on disinformation [21].”
The proposed working group would focus on a singular issue and in contrast to Option #1, a working group would have a tightly focused mission, limited staff, and only focus on a singular problem.
Risk:  Political will is in competition with success, meaning if the proposed working group does not show immediate success, more than likely it will be disbanded.  The group has the potential of being disbanded once the issue appears “solved.”
Gain:  A small and focused group has the potential to punch far above its weight.  As Schoen and Lamb point out “the group exposed Soviet disinformation at little cost to the United States but negated much of the effort mounted by the large Soviet bureaucracy that produced the multibillion dollar Soviet disinformation effort[22].”
Option #3:  The United States Government creates a dox and dump Wikileaks/Shadow Brokers style group[23][24].  If all else fails then engaging in attacks against adversary’s secrets and making them public could be an option.  Unlike the previous two options, this option does not necessarily represent a truthful approach, rather just truthiness[25].  In practice this means leaking/dumping data that reinforces and emphasizes a deleterious narrative concerning an adversary.  Thus, making their secrets very public, and putting the adversary in a compromising position.
Risk:  Burning data publicly might compromise sources and methods which would ultimately impede/stop investigations and prosecutions.  For instance, if an adversary has a deep and wide corruption problem is it more effective to dox and dump accounts and shell companies or engage in a multi-year investigatory process?  Dox and dump would have an immediate effect but an investigation and prosecution would likely have a longer effect.
Gain:  An organization and/or network is only as stable as its secrets are secure, and being able to challenge that security effectively is again.
Recommendation:  None

Endnotes:
[1]  Virag, Saso. (2017, April 23). Information and Information Warfare Primer. Retrieved from:  http://playgod.org/information-warfare-primer/
[2]  Waltzman, Rand. (2017, April 27). The Weaponization of Information: The Need of Cognitive Security. Testimony presented before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity on April 27, 2017.
[3]  Pomerantsev, Peter and Michael Weiss. (2014). The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture, and Money.
[4]  Matthews, Miriam and Paul, Christopher (2016). The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It
[5]  Giles, Keir. (2016, November). Handbook of Russian Information Warfare. Fellowship Monograph Research Division NATO Defense College.
[6]  Giles, Keir and Hagestad II, William. (2013). Divided by a Common Language: Cyber Definitions in Chinese, Russian, and English. 2013 5th International Conference on Cyber Conflict
[7]  Strategy Bridge. (2017, May 8). An Extended Discussion on an Important Question: What is Information Operations? Retrieved: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/5/8/an-extended-discussion-on-an-important-question-what-is-information-operations
[8] There is an interesting conceptual and academic debate to be had between what is information warfare and what is an information operation. In reality, there is no difference given that the United States’ adversaries see no practical difference between the two.
[9] State Department. (1998). USIA Overview. Retrieved from: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/oldoview.htm
[10]  Nuland, William, Stamos, Alex, and Weedon, Jen. (2017, April 27). Information Operations on Facebook.
[11]  Koerner, Brendan. (2016, March). Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War. Wired
[12]  Atlantic Council. (2017). Digital Forensic Research Lab Retrieved:  https://medium.com/dfrlab
[13]  Bellingcat. (2017).  Bellingcat: The Home of Online Investigations. Retrieved: https://www.bellingcat.com/
[14]  Bergen, Mark. (2016). Google Brings Fake News Fact-Checking to Search Results. Bloomberg News. Retrieved: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-07/google-brings-fake-news-fact-checking-to-search-results
[15]  NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. (2017). Retrieved: http://stratcomcoe.org/
[16]  National Public Radio. (2017, May 10). NATO Takes Aim at Disinformation Campaigns. Retrieved: http://www.npr.org/2017/05/10/527720078/nato-takes-aim-at-disinformation-campaigns
[17]  European Union External Action. (2017). Questions and Answers about the East Stratcom Task Force. Retrieved: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2116/-questions-and-answers-about-the-east-
[18]  Armstrong, Matthew. (2015, November 12). No, We Do Not Need to Revive The U.S. Information Agency. War on the Rocks. Retrieved:  https://warontherocks.com/2015/11/no-we-do-not-need-to-revive-the-u-s-information-agency/ 
[19]  For example the Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act included in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2017 acts more with the issues of funding, organization, and some strategy rather than legal infrastructure issues.  Retrieved: https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/hrpt840/CRPT-114hrpt840.pdf
[20]  The U.S Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 also known as the Smith-Mundt Act. The act effectively creates the basis for public diplomacy and the dissemination of government view point data abroad. The law also limits what the United States can disseminate at home. Retrieved: http://legisworks.org/congress/80/publaw-402.pdf
[21]  Lamb, Christopher and Schoen, Fletcher (2012, June). Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference. Retrieved: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-11.pdf
[22]  Lamb and Schoen, page 3
[23]  RT. (2016, October 3). Wikileaks turns 10: Biggest Secrets Exposed by Whistleblowing Project. Retrieved: https://www.rt.com/news/361483-wikileaks-anniversary-dnc-assange/
[24]  The Gruqg. (2016, August 18). Shadow Broker Breakdown. Retrieved: https://medium.com/@thegrugq/shadow-broker-breakdown-b05099eb2f4a
[25]  Truthiness is defined as “the quality of seeming to be true according to one’s intuition, opinion, or perception, without regard to logic, factual evidence, or the like.” Dictionary.com. Truthiness. Retrieved:  http://www.dictionary.com/browse/truthiness.
Truthiness in this space is not just about leaking data but also how that data is presented and organized. The goal is to take data and shape it so it feels and looks true enough to emphasize the desired narrative.

The new photo exhibit "Ukraine Will Flourish" by Ukrainian artist Volodymyr Kozyuk is now open for public viewing at the renovated premises of the Consular Section of the Embassy of Ukraine in the USA


mfa.gov.ua

Today, 02:37
The opening event has been attended by the official delegation from Vinnytsia region of Ukraine led by Head of Vinnytsia Regional State Administration Mr. Valerii Korovii and comprised of local government representatives and top managers of key regional businesses who are currently visiting Washington, DC to explore economic opportunities for the region and study the experience of attracting investments.
As Ambassador Valeriy Chaliy has noted, it is very important that people, who come to our Embassy, can make their first positive impression about Ukraine here. The new exhibition fits this purpose very well. Photos depict Ukrainian cultural heritage, love to native land and social tolerance, despite grave challenges that Ukraine is facing in connection to Russian aggression. The local community and Ukrainian diplomats were the first to see the new exhibition.
The Ambassador told delegates from Vinnytsia region about Embassy’s work, including public diplomacy projects. They discussed the ways in which the Embassy can be helpful in extending economic cooperation of the region and agreed to work further on that.

China: Two Paintings of Artist Zhang Yan Will Be Offered to Pope Francis


zenit.org

A Gesture of CCIIF, “in the Name of the Chinese People”

image from

Two paintings of Chinese artist Zhang Yan will be offered to Pope Francis tomorrow, May 31, 2017, “in the name of the Chinese people,’ by Zhu Jiancheng, Secretary General of the China Culture Industrial Investment Fund (CCIIF), pointed out a press release of the University of the Holy Cross.

The CCIIF depends on the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China and its mission is to promote and diffuse traditional Chinese culture.

A gesture that is situated in the wake of “The Diplomacy of Art,” a meeting organized at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross of Rome on Thursday, June 1, 2017, with Zhu Jiancheng and the Chinese artist Zhang Yan.

Here is a presentation of CCIIF and of its Secretary General, published by the same source in Italian.

The China Culture Industrial Investment Fund

The China Culture Industrial Investment fund (CCIIF) is a placement fund with a wide range of action, established in 2011 by the Chinese government with the subscription of important public cultural enterprises, large State-controlled agencies and the largest financial institutions on the basis of the Plan of Promotion of the Chinese Cultural Industry going back to 2009. The Fund is managed directly by the Chinese Ministry of Finance. The aim of the Fund is to support and promote the integration of culture and business as well as to diffuse traditional Chinese culture in the world. It works as strategic investor in different sectors of culture, including television and media, cinematographic productions, the press and editorial distribution, tourism, and cultural events, layouts of museums and artistic exhibitions, visual and entertainment arts, etc.

Its Secretary General is Zhu Jiancheng and its resources are 20 billion RMB.

Being the unique fund for the cultural industry at the national level, the CCIIF is able to promote cultural innovation and industrial modernization, integrating the cultural industry with other important industries, improving quality in the development of the cultural industry, promoting traditional Chinese culture and making an effort to obtain the creative transformation and innovation of the traditional culture. It is a strategic investor for the development of the national cultural sector.

With the aim of divulging Chinese culture in other countries, the CCIIF accords great importance to public diplomacy and cultural exchanges. The Secretary General Zhu Jiancheng has developed a vast activity and deepened cultural communication and cooperation with different Heads of State, among whom are the President of Israel Shimon Peres, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, Cambodian Prince Chea Sim, the Prince of the Low Countries of Orange, as well as international organizations, such as UNIDO, the World Green Design Organization and the World Cities Culture Forum, not forgetting the directors, producers and other cultural elites of Hollywood.

Its Secretary General Zhu Jiancheng

With funds of the initiative “One Belt One Road” the Secretary General Zhu Jiancheng has made an effort to promote the unique position of the CCIIF Funds as a national entity and he works to push the innovative model of economic cooperation between China and friendly countries as well as the creation of non-sovereign common investment funds, such as the China-Italy Funds, the China-Philippine Funds and the China-Australia Funds to promote cultural and artistic exchanges and communication between interested countries with “One Belt One Road.”

Zhu Jiancheng, born in November of 1964, has a Licentiate and a Master’s degree, is the present Secretary General of the CCIIF, had a long professional career at the Ministry of Finance where he filled different roles, including the management of human resources, financial investments, the management of the cultural industry and cultural exchanges, etc.

‘‘Chagall: Fantasies for the Stage’’ Exhibition

gpo.gov

Notice of Determinations; Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition Determinations: ‘‘Chagall: Fantasies for the Stage’’ Exhibition



Image of unnamed item from "Chagall: Fantasies for the Stage" from

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 (79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), E.O. 12047 of March 27, 1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236–3 of August 28, 2000 (and, as appropriate, Delegation of Authority No. 257–1 of December 11, 2015), I hereby determine that certain objects to be included in the exhibition  ‘‘Chagall: Fantasies for the Stage,’’ imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within the United States, are of cultural significance. The objects are imported pursuant to loan agreements with the foreign owners or custodians. I also determine that the exhibition or display of the exhibit objects at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, Los Angeles, California, from on or about July 31, 2017, until on or about January 7, 2018, and at possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is in the
national interest. I have ordered that Public Notice of these Determinations be published in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a list of the imported objects, contact the Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202–632–6471; email: section2459@
state.gov). The mailing address is U.S. Department of State, L/PD, SA–5, Suite 5H03, Washington, DC 20522–0505.

Alyson Grunder,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Bureau
of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2017–11123 Filed 5–30–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710–05–P


‘‘History, Heritage and Hope" exhibition


gpo.gov

Notice of Determinations; Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition Determinations: ‘‘History, Heritage and Hope’’ Exhibition

Image from "History, Heritage and Hope" Permanent Exhibition from

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 (79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), E.O. 12047 of March 27, 1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236–3 of August 28, 2000 (and, as appropriate, Delegation of Authority No. 257–1 of December 11, 2015), I hereby determine that certain objects to be included in the exhibition ‘‘History, Heritage and Hope,’’ imported from abroad for temporary display within the United States, are of cultural significance. The objects are imported pursuant to a loan agreement with the foreign owner or custodian. I also determine that the exhibition or display of the exhibit objects at The Florida Holocaust Museum, St. Petersburg, Florida, from on or about July 1, 2017, until on or about June 15, 2020, and at possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is in the national interest. I have ordered that Public Notice of these Determinations be published in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a list of the imported objects, contact the Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202–632–6471; email: section2459@
state.gov). The mailing address is U.S. Department of State, L/PD, SA–5, Suite 5H03, Washington, DC 20522–0505.

Alyson Grunder,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Bureau
of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2017–11123 Filed 5–30–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710–05–P

‘‘Helena Almeida: Work is never finished’’ Exhibition


gpo.gov

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[Public Notice: 10011]

Notice of Determinations; Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition Determinations: ‘‘Helena Almeida: Work is never finished’’ Exhibition

image from Almeida exhibit from

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 (79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), E.O. 12047 of March 27, 1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236–3 of August 28, 2000 (and, as appropriate, Delegation of Authority No. 257–1 of December 11, 2015), I hereby determine that certain objects to be included in the exhibition ‘‘Helena Almeida: Work is never finished,’’ imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within the United States, are
of cultural significance. The objects are imported pursuant to loan agreements with the foreign owners or custodians. I also determine that the exhibition or display of the exhibit objects at The Art Institute of Chicago, in Chicago, Illinois, from on or about June 29, 2017, until on or about September 4, 2017, and at possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is in the national interest. I have ordered that Public Notice of these Determinations be published in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a list of the imported objects, contact the Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202–632–6471; email: section2459@
state.gov). The mailing address is U.S. Department of State, L/PD, SA–5, Suite 5H03, Washington, DC 20522–0505.

Alyson Grunder,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Bureau
of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2017–11123 Filed 5–30–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710–05–P