Monday, September 4, 2017

How America Can Keep From Losing in the South China Sea


Tuan N. Pham, thediplomat.com

image from article


Washington is losing ground in the South China Sea, and risks making the situation lasting unless America imposes “real” strategic costs to China.


Excerpt:
Part one of this two-part series provided strategic perspectives and context to the recent uptick in tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) following a year of relative calm since the International Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague handed down its historic and sweeping award on maritime entitlements in the SCS last July. With this backdrop, part two will now examine ways and means the United States can regain the strategic initiative, recover the high ground of regional influence, and stave off losing in the SCS.  ... 
[Among them] Underscore the Arbitral Tribunal’s Legitimacy Through Words and Actions. Manila and Washington did not capitalize on last year’s hard-fought legal victory over China’s excessive and contested maritime claims in the SCS. However, it is still not too late to encourage Beijing to act as (or become) a more responsible global stakeholder that contributes positively to the international system.

This involves countering China’s public diplomacy point-for-point, and reiterating stated U.S. positions to unambiguously convey American national interests and shape the post-ruling diplomatic space: (1) The United States supports the principle that disputes between countries should be resolved peacefully, without coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force, and in a manner consistent with international law. (2) The United States supports the principle of freedom of seas, meaning the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all nations in international law. United States opposes claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea that belong to all nations. (3) The United States takes no position on competing claims to sovereignty over disputed land features in the East China Sea (ECS) and SCS. (4) Although the United States takes no position on competing claims to sovereignty over disputed land features in the ECS and SCS, the United States does have a position on how competing claims should be resolved. Territorial disputes should be resolved peacefully, without coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force, and in a manner consistent with international law. (5) Claims of territorial waters and EEZ should be consistent with customary international law of the sea and must therefore, among other things, derive from land features. Claims in the SCS that are not derived from land features are fundamentally flawed. (6) Parties should avoid taking provocative or unilateral actions that disrupt the status quo or jeopardize peace and security. The United States does not believe that large-scale land reclamation with the intent to militarize outposts on disputed land features is consistent with the region’s desire for peace and stability. (7) The United States, like most other countries, believes that coastal states under UNCLOS have the right to regulate economic activities in their EEZ, but do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZ. (8) U.S. military surveillance flights in international airspace above another country’s EEZ are lawful under international law, and the United States plans to continue conducting these flights as it has in the past.

The upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Meeting, U.S.-ASEAN Summit, and East Asia Summit (EAS) in Vietnam and the Philippines respectively offer a strategic opportunity for U.S. President Donald Trump to advocate for implementation of the 2016 arbitration decision, call for a substantive and legally binding COC, restate U.S. national interests in the SCS, and reinforce U.S. commitment to its regional allies and partners. Such open and public policy statements will have a significant influence in shaping China and the region.

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