The Quad and the South China Sea

Mark J. Valencia, ippreview.com

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Excerpt:

The Trump administration has re-raised the decade-old geopolitical concept of the “Indo-Pacific” region and is proposing and pushing a so-called “Quad” — a potential security arrangement among the four large democracies of India, Australia, Japan, and the US. Given the dominant maritime nature of the Indo-Pacific, and that all four prospective members are maritime powers, any security arrangement would likely be initially focused on cooperation in the maritime sphere. ...

Over the past 40 years, China has made a series of assertive moves in the South China Sea, and has been undeterred by protests from other claimants and stern warnings from the US. It has built military-capable facilities and increased its military assets on the features it occupies; it has thrown its weight around when other countries try to unilaterally exploit resources in some areas it claims; and it has rejected an international arbitration decision against its claims there and then carried on as if nothing has happened. More, it has used its increased influence in recent ASEAN meetings to suppress any critical statements against it. China has had many other incremental military and diplomatic advances there that when considered together indicate a trend that has alarmed the region — and the US.

Its latest diplomatic victory was clear from US President Donald J. Trump’s recent visit to the region. He hardly mentioned the South China Sea — at least publicly — let alone confronted China on those issues, as many had hoped. What he said and did not say convinced many seasoned observers that China has gained the diplomatic edge over its rival claimants and the US in the South China Sea, if not the entire region. The results of the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), and associated summits seemed to confirm this perception. Many analysts agreed that China won this round of the struggle between it and the other claimants for political advantage in the South China Sea disputes. Moreover, the general sense was that this was a clear setback for the US as well — particularly in its public diplomacy contest with China. ...