Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a regular contributor to PostEverything.
[video] Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said "all options are on table" when confronting North Korea's nuclear threat, while speaking in Seoul on March 17. He also commented on China's opposition to the South Korea bringing in American anti-ballistic systems. (Reuters)
I bring this up because Tuesday night Erin McPike, the one reporter permitted on Tillerson’s plane for his latest trip, filed her 3,300-word story. Reading it, I have come to one unmistakable conclusion: I was wrong about encouraging Tillerson to speak with the press. Tillerson should shut the heck up until he demonstrates that he knows what he’s talking about.
This interview is terrifying, but not for the reason that Twitter focused on Tuesday night:
The scary part of that passage is not that Tillerson’s wife talked him into being secretary of state. The scary part is that Tillerson said he had never met Trump before being asked to be secretary of state. The history of modern foreign policy principals who agreed to serve in an administration after just meeting the president is short but undistinguished. Still, McPike’s reporting also shows that Tillerson recognizes his need to build personal relationships, with Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis most importantly. And he seems to want to build his relationship with the president.
No, there are two other aspects of McPike’s story that suggest Tillerson’s path along the learning curve is still long and steep. The first is his rationale for cutting the State Department budget. He thinks that the budget can be cut as the United States reduces its military footprint overseas, telling McPike, “Looking at ongoing conflicts, if we accept that we’re just going to continue to never solve any of these conflicts, then the budget should stay at the current level.”
And then we get to this section:
On Wednesday, Tillerson will host representatives from the 68 member nations in the coalition to defeat ISIS at the State Department to walk through the Trump administration’s latest plans. As he explained it to IJR, it’s a three-step process beginning with a military campaign, followed by a transition phase, and ending with a stability program.
Well, gosh, it almost sounds like in this three-step process, there has to be a surge in diplomacy after a military drawdown. Which make sense, what with the failed states in Syria, Libya, etc. So I don’t see how solving conflicts leads to any reduced demand for diplomatic resources. If anything, there should be a surge in resources to make sure the transition and stability phases work as planned.
I’m not the only one who doesn’t get this, by the way. Consider this from former Bush 43 national security adviser Steve Hadley:
[Hadley] pointed out that military action alone was not enough to secure that objective. “ISIS will return in an even more vicious and virulent form if those liberated lands to do not enjoy some measure of political stability, societal reconciliation, and economic progress. And such progress requires the very nonmilitary elements of national power targeted by the recent budget guidance,” he stated.
There’s also a point that’s so obvious and banal that no one has really bothered to make it, but here goes: One of the obvious functions of the State Department is to help shape the lay of the land in countries that are not conflict-ridden but have the potential to become so. Early diplomatic interventions are a great way to preclude later, more costly military interventions. Mattis certainly understood this point when he testified in March 2013, “‘if you don’t fully fund the State Department, then I need to buy more ammunition.” Perhaps he should share this observation in one of his tête-à-têtes with Tillerson.
The other scary part is Tillerson’s narrow vision of what the State Department is supposed to do. He staunchly defended his reticence in speaking to the news media to McPike:
[Tillerson] told me that, in general, the way the last administration operated in being so public with its goals was not helpful to them.
“It was a huge mistake and put them at a huge disadvantage,” he said sternly, the only time his emotion wavered, though it was still a long way from anger.
“We’ve got a lot going on inside the State Department, and we’re not talking about it until we’re ready, and that’s driving a lot of people nuts,” he said. He was so cagey when Russia came up, for example, that his answer wasn’t even worthy of inclusion.
In a way, it mirrors the kind of strategy you might see at a big business like Apple. Tech consumers might know a new version of an iPhone is forthcoming, but they don’t get the details until the day of the release, when Apple is fully prepared for the big reveal.
No doubt, there are diplomatic initiatives that fall under the category of, “let’s keep this quiet until almost everything has been worked out.” But if Tillerson thinks that is all the secretary of state does, then he’s rejecting more than half of his job description. Reassuring allies requires some public signaling. Credible commitments require even more public signaling. Promoting ideas like human rights or religious freedom through publicizing annual reports is a really super-inexpensive way of sending a message.
A Princeton PhD, was a US diplomat for over 20 years, mostly in Eastern Europe, and was promoted to the Senior Foreign Service in 1997. For the Open World Leadership Center, he speaks with
its delegates from Europe/Eurasia on the topic, "E Pluribus Unum? What Keeps the United States United" (http://johnbrownnotesandessays.blogspot.com/2017/03/notes-and-references-for-discussion-e.html). Affiliated with Georgetown University for over ten years, he shares ideas with students about public diplomacy.
The papers of his deceased father -- poet and diplomat John L. Brown -- are stored at Georgetown University Special Collections at the Lauinger Library. They are manuscript materials valuable to scholars interested in post-WWII U.S.-European cultural relations.
This blog is dedicated to him, Dr. John L. Brown, a remarkable linguist/humanist who wrote in the Foreign Service Journal (1964) -- years before "soft power" was ever coined -- that "The CAO [Cultural Affairs Officer] soon comes to realize that his job is really a form of love-making and that making love is never really successful unless both partners are participating."