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Wednesday, December 2nd 2015
President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act into law on November 25, 2015. One section provided the Secretary of Defense with additional authorities to “develop creative and agile concepts, technologies, and strategies across all available media to most effectively reach target audiences, to counter and degrade the ability of adversaries and potential adversaries to persuade, inspire, and recruit inside areas of hostilities or in other areas in direct support of the objectives of commanders . . .”
The earlier May 5, 2015 House Armed Services Committee Report on the original House version of the bill (HR 1735) included many mentions of Information Operations and propaganda. There were additional references in the Senate Armed Services Report of May 19, 2015 (link below). Reference to the reports aids in understanding the provisions of the NDAA that relate to information operations and military information support operations.
From the House of Representatives report:
Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office
The budget request included $71.2 million in PE 63122D8Z
for the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO).
The CTTSO identifies capabilities to combat terrorism and
irregular adversaries and delivers these capabilities to
geographic combatant commanders, the military services, the
interagency, and international partners. The committee notes
CTTSO's track record of success in demonstrating the
effectiveness of technology when applied to combating terrorism
and irregular warfare requirements, and that the CTTSO has most
recently developed several capabilities to counter the growing
threat being posed by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL). The committee remains concerned with the success of
ISIL's messaging and propaganda, and its ability to persuade,
inspire, and recruit from across the globe. ISIL's continued
success on the battlefield depends on this messaging, and the
group's propaganda attracts recruits and other support that
enables the organization to persist. Consequently, the
committee believes that the campaign to degrade and defeat ISIL
on the battlefield must be coupled with a comparable effort to
degrade and defeat ISIL's message in the minds of potential
supporters. The committee believes that the CTTSO is uniquely
positioned to help counter ISIL's narrative and battlefield
successes, and to enhance U.S., allied, and international
partner Information Operations capabilities to mitigate and
marginalize ISIL's ability to influence and inspire. Elsewhere
in this Act, the committee includes a provision that would
provide additional authority for a pilot program to support
information operations and strategic communications
capabilities.
The committee urges the CTTSO to work with the combatant
commands to provide technological and operational capabilities
to support the tactical, operational, and strategic
requirements of the combatant commanders. Further, the
committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict to brief the
House Committee on Armed Services not later than July 30, 2015,
on additional counter-ISIL activities and initiatives being
conducted by the CTTSO.
The committee recommends $96.2 million, an increase of
$25.0 million, in PE 63122D8Z for the Combating Terrorism
Technical Support Office for distinct and focused counter-ISIL
efforts, global in nature, including support for geographic
combatant commander information operations requirements.
- - - - -
Technology supporting information operations and strategic
communications
The budget request contained $33.5 million in PE 63699D8Z
for emerging capabilities technology development, including for
concept development of emerging irregular warfare technology
needs, and demonstrations that have joint and interagency
applicability.
The committee remains particularly concerned with the
success of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
messaging and propaganda, and ISIL's ability to persuade,
inspire, and recruit from across the globe. ISIL's continued
success on the battlefield depends on this messaging, and the
group's propaganda attracts recruits and other support that
enables the organization to persist. Consequently, the
committee believes that the campaign to degrade and defeat ISIL
on the battlefield must be mated with a comparable effort to
degrade and defeat ISIL's message in the minds of potential
supporters. The committee believes that there is a critical
need for technologies and strategies to help counter ISIL's
narrative and battlefield successes, and to enhance U.S.,
allied, and international partner information operations
capabilities to mitigate and marginalize ISIL's ability to
influence and inspire. Elsewhere in this report, the committee
provides additional authority for a pilot program to support
information operations and strategic communications
capabilities. The committee urges the Department of Defense to
work with the combatant commands to provide technological and
operational capabilities to support the tactical, operational,
and strategic requirements of the various combatant commanders.
The committee is aware that the Emerging Capabilities
Technology Development (ECTD) program and its predecessors have
been instrumental in assessing the technology needs of the
strategic communication and information operations communities,
and have pursued successful demonstration of some of those
capabilities. For example, the Information Operations
Assessment Foundation effort identified best practices in the
Department, industry, and academia to help develop and refine
processes and tools for information operations assessments, and
transitioned to the Joint Information Operations Warfare
Center. ECTD has also developed an influence assessment
training capability project for use in both influence
assessment and Theater Campaign Planning, as well as a Web-
based counter-messaging prototype tool that was delivered to
the interagency Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications at the Department of State and is being
considered for transition to other potential combatant command
users.
Therefore, the committee recommends $43.5 million, an
increase of $10.0 million, in PE 63699D8Z to support the
development and demonstration of technologies supporting
information operations and strategic communications. Of that,
$5.0 million should be applied to countering Russian Federation
propaganda, and $5.0 million should be applied to countering
the propaganda of ISIL.
- - - - -
United States Special Operations Command Global Inform and Influence
Activities
The budget request included $24.7 million in Operation and
Maintenance, Defense-Wide, for U.S. Special Operations Command
global inform and influence activities. The committee notes
that this program will resource the geographic combatant
commanders military information support operations, as well as
inform and influence activities. The budget request includes
increases that are directly attributed to military information
operational gaps.
Elsewhere in this report, the committee expresses concern
with the information operations being conducted by the
Federation of Russia in Ukraine and Eastern Europe, and the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and provides
additional authority for a pilot program to support information
operations and strategic communications capabilities. The
committee urges U.S. Special Operations Command to leverage
this authority to enhance information-related and strategic
communications capabilities to support the tactical,
operational, and strategic requirements of the various
combatant commanders, including urgent and emergent operational
needs, and the operational and theater security cooperation
plans of the geographic and functional combatant commanders.
Therefore, the committee recommends $54.7 million, an
increase of $30.0 million, for U.S. Special Operations Command
global inform and influence activities to expand activities
against the Russian Federation and ISIL. The committee further
directs the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict to provide a briefing to the House Committee
on Armed Services not later than July 30, 2015, on global
inform and influence activities, with an emphasis on efforts to
counter Russian and ISIL propaganda.
- - - - -
Section 1088--Department of Defense Strategy for Countering
Unconventional Warfare
This section would required the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the President and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, to develop a strategy for the Department of
Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by
adversarial state and non-state actors. This section would
require the Secretary of Defense to submit the strategy to the
congressional defense committees within 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
The committee is concerned about the growing unconventional
warfare capabilities and threats being posed most notably and
recently by the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of
Iran. The committee notes that unconventional warfare is
defined most accurately as those activities conducted to enable
a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or
overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through
or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a
denied area. The committee also notes that most state-sponsors
of unconventional warfare, such as Russia and Iran, have
doctrinally linked conventional warfare, economic warfare,
cyber warfare, information operations, intelligence operations,
and other activities seamlessly in an effort to undermine U.S.
national security objectives and the objectives of U.S. allies
alike.
- - - - -
The committee has also focused on the Department's efforts
to deter aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine
and other allies and partners in Europe. The committee
recognizes that Russia has employed unconventional warfare
methods in areas such as cyber warfare, economic warfare,
information operations, and intelligence operations, and
believes that the Department's European Reassurance Initiative
efforts should focus on countering such methods, as well as
continuing conventional reassurance and deterrence activities.
The bill would also authorize appropriations to provide
sustainment and assistance to the military and national
security forces of Ukraine, including the explicit
authorization of lethal weapons of a defensive nature to
enhance the defense of Ukraine and deter further Russian
aggression.
- - - - -
Funding and Support for the European Reassurance Initiative
The budget request included $789.3 million for the European
Reassurance Initiative (ERI). The committee supports the policy
and activities contained in the ERI, which was originally
proposed as part of the budget request for fiscal year 2015.
However, the committee observes that these initiatives are
largely focused on conventional reassurance and deterrence
activities. The committee also recognizes that the Russian
Federation has employed unconventional warfare methods in areas
such as cyber warfare, economic warfare, information
operations, and intelligence operations, and believes the
Department of Defense should increase its focus on countering
such methods.
The committee believes that ERI funds for fiscal year 2016
should be allocated for continued conventional reassurance and
deterrence activities, as outlined in section 1535 of the Carl
Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113-291), as
well as countering unconventional threats. Therefore, elsewhere
in this Act, the committee includes a provision that would: (1)
lay out a statement of policy regarding ERI; (2) require a
Department of Defense strategy to address unconventional
warfare methods; and (3) authorize increased funding for U.S.
intelligence and warning capabilities related to the European
theater, technologies supporting U.S. information operations
and strategic communications activities, the Javelin weapon
system, and Stryker combat vehicle upgrades to meet U.S. Army
Europe operational needs.
The committee further believes that, as part of the U.S.
effort to increase security assistance to allies and partners
in Europe, ERI funds should be allocated to provide both
nonlethal equipment and lethal equipment of a defensive nature
to Ukraine. Therefore, elsewhere in this Act, the committee
includes a provision that would authorize appropriations to
provide sustainment and assistance to the military and national
security forces of Ukraine.
The committee believes that all of these U.S. efforts taken
in combination are vital to address regional security and to
deter and counter continued Russian aggression. The committee
further believes that these efforts should be enduring and must
be sustained as core activities of the Department of Defense in
Europe.
- - - - -
Russian Unconventional Warfare
Tactics employed by the Russian Federation in its
aggression against Ukraine are not unique. However, Russia has
combined them in new, effective, and troubling ways. It has
fomented and taken advantage of ethnic disputes to train,
build, and equip a separatist army in Ukraine under Russian
direction. It has combined this line of effort with propaganda,
diplomatic, and economic measures to try to reduce the
effectiveness of Ukraine's response, as well as the response of
the United States and Europe, and to preserve and extend its
perceived sphere of influence.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most
successful military alliance in history, defending the security
interests of its members against external threats for over 60
years. The committee supports the NATO alliance and believes
that it can successfully continue to serve as a bedrock for
U.S. and European security. However, the committee notes that
the methods currently being used by Russia in Ukraine pose a
challenge to the NATO system.
The core of the NATO alliance is provided by Article 5 of
the Washington Treaty, which enshrines the principle of
collective self-defense: ``The Parties agree that an armed
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all . . .'' In the
wake of Russian actions in Ukraine, both the United States, in
a series of bilateral actions referred to as the European
Reassurance Initiative, and NATO collectively, in the Readiness
Action Plan, have taken steps to ensure that all parties are
postured to respond to any new aggression. The committee is
concerned, however, that these steps may not sufficiently
address the challenges posed by Russian tactics.
At its core, collective self-defense requires that the
parties to the treaty agree that one of the members is under
attack. This implies that such aggression can be correctly
attributed to some actor outside the alliance. Russia's actions
have been designed to be deniable and difficult to attribute
directly to Russian government activity. Should similar
tactics, or even more covert methods, be applied to NATO member
states that border Russia, it may be difficult to attribute
them to Russian activity and therefore difficult to trigger a
collective NATO response. It is likely that some NATO members
will have different views on the degree of Russian involvement.
In addition, it is possible that Russia would perceive NATO may
have difficulty in coming to an agreement about a collective
response, which could undermine NATO's ability to deter Russia
from engaging in attempts to intervene in sovereign issues of
NATO members.
The committee believes that the Department of Defense, and
NATO, should fully explore how the United States, NATO, and
member states can, as necessary, establish deterrence
mechanisms against activities such as those undertaken by the
Russian government in Ukraine. The committee directs the
Secretary of Defense, acting through the Office of Net
Assessment or other such organization as the Secretary
considers appropriate, to undertake a study exploring various
strategies for deterring external efforts to interfere with the
internal workings of NATO member states by Russia, or any other
actor utilizing tactics such as propaganda in media, economic
warfare, cyber warfare, criminal acts, and intelligence
operations, similar to those being used by Russia in Ukraine.
The committee expects the Secretary to deliver a report to the
congressional defense committees containing the findings of
such study not later than March 31, 2016.
This study would complement a provision contained elsewhere
in this Act requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop a
strategy for the Department of Defense to counter
unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and
non-state actors.
Here are excerpts of the Senate report on their parallel bill – S. 1376.
The committee has watched with increasing concern the
proliferation and expansion of Russian propaganda not only in
Eastern Europe, but also throughout Central and Western Europe
to levels not seen since the end of the Cold War. Russian-
speaking populations in Eastern Europe in former Soviet Union
nations, including North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
allies, are especially vulnerable to propaganda that could be
used to create more favorable conditions for future Russian
aggression. Moreover, the sophistication and pervasiveness of
outlets such as the Russia Today (RT) television network that
broadcast in multiple languages in Western European democracies
is cause for concern.
The committee notes that Russian propaganda has promoted a
false narrative on the nature, scope, and cause of the conflict
in Crimea and eastern Ukraine and has unfortunately achieved
some success with targeted audiences in obscuring attribution
for Russian-driven aggression and disregard for sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and international law.
The committee recognizes that propaganda is a critical
element of Russia's ``hybrid warfare'' concept. The speed and
reach of Russian propaganda and the ambiguity it creates pose a
challenge to NATO collective defense and the political
consensus upon which it relies.
Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of
Defense to consult with the Secretary of State with the
objective of developing a strategy, including supporting
resources, to counter Russian propaganda in Europe.
The report included “Additional Views” of several senators. This was added by Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK).
My greatest disappointment in the bill is the inclusion of
language that would allow the closure of the detention center
at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba, and the eventual transfer of
GTMO detainees to the United States. Members from many states
have voiced concern with housing these terrorists in their
states, especially now that ISIL has demonstrated the ability
to call up sleeper cells to attack locations here in our
country. Furthermore, I disagree with those who think that
closing the detention facility at GTMO will end the propaganda
campaign being waged by our enemies. The propaganda war will
simply shift to whatever facility these terrorists are brought
to in the U.S., allowing them to engage in a whole new
propaganda campaign against `GTMO North.' The terrorists
created GTMO's image, not actions at GTMO. The attacks leading
up to, including on and after 9/11, were not the result of
holding detainees at GTMO. Moving these terrorists held at GTMO
to the United States will not stop future terrorist attacks
against our homeland. We are at war; these are war criminals
and need to be handled accordingly. The President continues to
want to deal with this threat through law enforcement. Law
enforcement alone is not enough to protect us. Furthermore, the
risk of a terrorist's release in the U.S., or elsewhere, and
the security risk to those living near the location selected to
house these terrorists is too great in my opinion.
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