James Lamond, Center for American Progress
Image from article, with caption: The Kremlin and Saint Basil's Cathedral on the Red Square in Moscow by night.
Excerpt:
Overview
The Russian attack on U.S. democracy began in 2014 and is more wide-ranging and coordinated than previously understood. How the United States responds requires a strategy that both applies pressure on Russia via additional sanctions and improves the United States’ defensive capabilities against further Russian interference. ...
Introduction and summary
On January 6, 2017, the U.S. intelligence community released a declassified assessment to the public confirming what most had already suspected: Russian President Vladimir Putin had ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential election.1 Since the intelligence community released its assessment, the public has learned a great deal about this assault from the special counsel investigation, press reporting, and declassified intelligence. Based on analysis of available material, it has become increasingly clear when, how, and why Russia launched the campaign against American democracy. It is evident that there was a surge of activity intended to influence the American electorate and political institutions that originated in 2014 as a counterresponse to the U.S.-led international isolation of Russia following its intervention in Ukraine.
To be clear, Russia’s use of political weaponry against the United States extends further back than just 2014. In fact, a 1981 U.S. State Department Special Report defined Soviet active measures as “operations intended to affect other nations’ policies, as distinct from espionage and counterintelligence,” but not including the legitimate tools of public diplomacy. [JB emphasis] 2 The 1981 report highlights many of the same instruments that Russia uses today, including disinformation, controlling foreign media, deploying front groups, using blackmail, and engaging in political-influence operations.3 ...
Endnotes
1. National Intelligence Council, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections, (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017), p.2, available at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. ↩
2. Bureau of Public Affairs, Soviet “Active Measures”: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations, Special Report No. 88 (U.S. Department of State, 1981), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00049R001303150031-0.pdf. ↩
3. Ibid. ↩
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